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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2387 • • 1 ' with a like covenant-for future renewals' of the 'lease as is contained in this lease, and upon the same terms and con- ~ ditfons, except as to the amount of the rental reserved .which is contained in ~ Paragraph 2 of this Agreement= provided the Lessee shall give notice in writing to the. Lessor one month prior to the expiration.of this Lease, or any renewal. ! thereof of h~.s intention to renew this ~ ~ Lease Agreement." t violates the rule against perpetuities described in Story v. First National Bank & Trust Co., in Orlando, 115 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101, as providing that: "The vesting of an estate under a will ~ or deed can be postponed no longer than a life or lives in being and twenty-one years plus the period of gestation." In determining whether or not the lease renewal clause set out above violates the rule against perpetuities, one needs to understand the rule. A good explanation of the rule appears in 8 Fla. Law Review, 467, wherein Mr. Sparks states: "The goal posts of the perpetuities game are to be sound in the ' Anglo-American concept of private property. The salient fact there ~ is that that concept includes an entity known as a future interest. It is recognized chat a property owner has a power, and in fact a right, to divide his property both vertically and horizontally: He is per- mitred to split his property into successive interests as well a: into concurrent interests. The moment he divides it into successive interests he creates a future interest. When John Smith disposes of Blackacre by saying. "I give Blackacre to my wife. Susan, [or life and upon her death to my son, Edward;' he has ueated two successive interests in Blackacre. Susan has a present interest and Edward a future interest. In the process of dividing his property into these succeuive interests the owner is permitted to leave some uncertainty as to who shall eventually own some or all of those interests. Instead of saying, "I t give Blackaue to my wife. Susan, for life and upon her death to my ~ e son, Edward;' he might say. "1 give Blackacre to my wife, Susan, for life and upon her death to such of my lineal descendants as shall be living when Susan dies," or "to such of my children as Susan shall by. will appoint." In these instances it cannot presently be determined I who will own Blackacre alter Susan's death. That is to be determined i by subsequent events. In this situation John Smith, the original owner } of Blackacre. is dead. He is no longer a member of society. He no longer has righu and is no longer subject to duties. Yet it is his word which says that the ultimate owners of Blackacre cannot be determined s at this time. Our customs, our .mores, and the laws that we have es- ~ tablished demand that property ownen be permitted to make this kind of disposition. We almost instinctively recognize this right as a necessary incident to property ownerahip~ What we often fail to realize is that a recognition of this right means permitting the hand of a bygone day and a voice that has already been stilled by death to dsctate the distribution of the wealth of the present generation. To what extent should this control by the dead be permitted? if left com• pletely uncontrolled it would be possible to have a situation in which substantially all the economic goods is the world at a given time would be oontsolled by the put, a situation in which tbt living generation . • ~ 0 23 g S -2- 'F.