HomeMy WebLinkAbout0862 f
:i -
- ~ -
_ _ 1
i
i _
1
_ _ 1-
-
-
_ . 1.
- _ - -
_ ~ ~
Ia accord sea Smith v. Parrish, 262 So.2d 237-
(Fla. 1st DCi1 v. Ring,-250 So.2d
913 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971).
in 1972, Section 193.461 was substantially
modified by Chapta= 72-181, Laws of Florida (1972).
Howeosr, as evidenced by subsection (3)(b) of the
statute, 'use' is still the guidepost in classify-
ing land
354 So.2d at 370.
- - ~
Based upon our sxastination of these statutes, we concluded that
"[a]gricultural use is now and always has base the test [ia classifying ~
.land]' under Section 193.461(3). That statement merely constitutes a
recognition that the legislature has generally chosen to classify - -
land on the basis of use rather than an implication that Article VZZ,
Section 4(a) of our Constitution requires that resin;:. However; the
above quote from Tuck is somewhat misleading sa that we failed to
distinguish the single instance considered by this Court prior to
Tuck wherein the legislature chose not to base.agricultural classfyina-
tion upon the "use" standard. Ia !tainey v. Nelson, supra, we sustained
i
the constitutionality of Section 193.461(4)(b), Florida Statutea.(1973), -
which permits county agricultural zoning boards to deny as agricultural
~ classification if the prescribed statutory criteria are satisfied,- ~
a
~ irreapective~of the taxpayer's continued agricultural use of the
3
subject property._-
appellee next contends that Section 193.461(4)(a)4., Florida
Statutes (1975),- deprives it of due pzocess of law in that: (li the
statute is arbitrary, unreasonable and not reasonably related to a
valid legislative purpose; and (2) it creates an impermissible
i~-rebuttable presumption because three is no rational relation between
the fact proved (platting) and the fact presumed (that the platted land
is not presently being used for good faith commercial agricultural
purposes). This is purportedly contrast' to the oQiaion of this Court
Our recent decision is Roden v. K ~ H Land Management, Inc.,
368 So.2d 588 (Fla. 1978), wherein
we affirmed the above-quoted proposition enunciated in Strauglin v.
Tuck, supra, is also misleading in this respect. However, Roden
involved a consideration of 5193.461(4)(c), Fla. Stet. (197,
which ,
provides that the payment o! a purchase price which is three or sore
times the agricultural assessment shall create a rebuttable presuap-
tion of aonagricultntal use. Consequently, the recognition which we
made in Straughn v. Tuck--that the test of classification is agricul-
tural use--is indeed applicable to the statute in issue is Roden.
i
_6_ x317 PEE 86i , ,