HomeMy WebLinkAbout0863 iii
iF, .
•
. - ~ - 1 ~ - -
1 .
_
S ~ ~ _ -
- r
• •t'~
- ~ ~1
. i -
_ _ - .
_ -
- ~ -
. / ~
in Strau9hA v.- 1C 4 X Laced Management, Inc„ supra. Tha circuit court -
based its invalidation of Section 193.461(4)(x)4. on the second ground.
The taxable.status of property is determined on January 1 of -
each year. Section 192.042, Florida Statutes (1975). This is the -
date on which the property appraiser datesmines whether a specified
parcel of property is entitled to the preferential tax treatment - _
accorded agricultural property. Sae Overstreet v. Ty-Tan~Inc., 48
So.2d 138 (Fla. 1950). Appellee argues that r.~ actual (present) use
of its land on the assassmeat date, rather than the use which it
intends to make of the property at some future date,~is detesminative
of whether it should have received an agricultural classification.
Because Section 193.461(4)(x)4. creates as irrebutt:able presumption _
_ that property upon which a subdivision plat has been filed is presently
I -
i being used for nonagricultural purposes, argues appellee, the enact-
_ sent effects a denial of due process. Appellee points to the stipulation
between itself and appellants that the subject property constitutes
agricultural land as defined by Section 193.461(3i(b), supra, and that •
the sole basis for its reclassification is the filing of a subdivision
plat. Therefore, posits appellee, subsection (4)(x)4. renders its _
actual use of the property immaterial to the detesaination of whether 'f
it is entitled to as agricultural classification.
Appellants, on the other hand. argue that the recording of a
plat constitutes a clear signal of a change is the present use of the -
property from agricultural to nonagricultural. Consequently, the
fact presumed by Section 193.461(4)(x)4., that lands within its ambit
are in fact beiaq utilized for nonagricultural purposes, is rationally
related to the fact proved (that platting has occurred). Appellants
alternatively point to the decision of the Court in Rainey v. Nelson,
supra, wherein, by sustaining the constitutionality of Section
193.461(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1973), we implicitly recognized that
the legislature may classify property according to criteria which are
unrelated to its present physical use. Consequently, argue appellants,
the legislature is Eras to define nonagricultural property in the
manner accomplished by Section 193.461(4)(x)4. even if this definition
renders the existence of present agricultural nee irsoaterial to the _
-7 g~X~~~ PAGE OV~ .