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interpreted to reader actual use of the purported tax exempt facility
on the lots of assessweat the controlling factor is the great of as -
exemption. Ia Dade County Teeing Authorities v. Cedars of Lebanon
Hospital Corp., 355 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 1978), where actual use of a "
facility as a nonprofit hospital had not comeaced by January 1, the
asaessmsnt data, exasiptioa was denied for that tax year despite the
fact that the taxpayer intended to utilize the facility in as exempt
" manner at a time shortly subsequent. to the date of assessment. AcT rd,
Lake worth Towers v. Gerstung, 262 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1972). As we noted "
_ in Cedars-of Lebanon, the actual use doctrine has also been applied
to homestead exemptions. Actual physical occupancy of_a home as of
the statutorily specified date is as essential ingredient of the
homestead exemption right. See"Croker v. Croker, 51 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.
1931); Solary v. Hewlett, 18 Fla. 756.(1882). Cf. Anderson !fill i
Lumber Caaopany v. Clearents, 101 Pla. 523, 134 So. 588 (1931).
in the case before us, we are persuaded that the legislature
I was attempting, through the enactment of Section 193.461(4)(a)4.,
_ Florida Statutes (1975), to preclude preferential ad valorem tax
treatment for property Which is not
being used primarily for good faith commercial agricultural purposes. ~
'This enactment creates a conclusive presumption that land which was
previously classified as-agricultural based upon its use consistent
with that classification has, by virtue of the mere filing of a
subdivision plat, been converted to a present noaagrict~ltural use.
Because this .presumption is irrebuttable, the constitutionality of
Sectiaa 193.461(4)(a)4. under the Due Process Clause must be -
measured by determining. (1) whether the concern of the lagislature
was reas~ably aroused by the possibility of as abuse which it
" legitimately desired to avoid; (2) whether there was a reasonable "
basis for a conclusion that the statute would protect agaiaat its
occurrence; and (3) whether the expense and other difficulties of
individual determinations justify the inherent imprecision of a
conclusive-,presumption. See wsinberger v. Salfi, 422 O.S. 749 (1975);
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~~3~.7 Pa~E 864 ,