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Gallia v. Kainwright, 362 So.2d 936 (Fla. 1978).4
As we have indicated, the_lagislativa desire to extend
preferential tax treatment only to those individuals who are in fact
utilizing their property for agricultural purposes is reasonable.
However, Section 193.461(4)(a)4. is simply not rationally related -
to the achievasaat of that goal. This is so because there is ao -t
rational connection bstwaaa the fact proved and the ultimate fact_
presumed. United States v. Gainey, 380 Q.S. 63 (1965): Tot v. Qnited
States, 319 Q.S. 463 (1943)t Straugha v. R a R Land .+tanageserit, Inc.,
supra. It is sot reasonable -to presume that the laadowaer who has _
donne ao more than file a subdivision plat has ceased to use his
property for agricultural purposes. The filing of a subdivision plat _
has as Little to do with the present use of property as does the fact
that the owner of Land previously denominated as agricultural has
acquired the property sor a price which is three or more times its -
agriculturally assessed value. Yet in Strangha v. R ~ R Laad !lanage-
ment, Inc., supra, ws sustained the constitutionality of .Section
193.461(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1973), which pceates a presumption
of nonagricultural use upon proof that this purchase price criterion
has bees met. Tile crucial distinction between the enactment before ~r
- us and that is issue is Stranghn,-however, is that the latter statute
enables the property owner to overcome the presumption of nonagricultural
use by submitting evidence of 'special ciraumstaaces• suggesting that
the agricultural use will continua. Consequently, subsection (4)(c)
of Chapter 193 is is tact reasonably related to the legislative goal -
of granting preferential tax treatment only to property which is in
fact being utilized for agricultural pusposes as of the date of
assessment. The failure of Section 193.461(4)(a)4. to contain a
Tbis due process test of 'reasonableness" is utilized to
determine the ooastitutionality of- irrebuttable presumptions which _
do not affect a constitutionally preferred right or privilege.
Because, as we noted in Rainey v. Nelson, supra, there is ao right
to preferential ad valorea tax treatment for agricultural property,
this is the proper test. i~ihen a constitutionally preferred right or
privilege is in issue, however, the more stringent due process test
is invoked and the irrebnttable presuaptioa is deemed invalid 'when
IitJ is not aecsssarily or universal~y true in fact,. and when the
State has reasonable alternative mesas of making the crucial
determination.' See Vlandis v. !Cline, 412 Q.S. 441, 452 (1973).
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