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similar curative provision render its test for eligibility for
agricultural classification one of intended future use, rather than
actual agricultural use as of the assessment date. -
The legislative grant of the right of rebuttal to purchasers
of property who come-within the ambit of subsection (4)(c), supra,
deawnstrates that there is a reasonable alternative means of asking
the determination of whether platted land is continuing to be used
for agricultural purposes, other than through the utilization of as
irrebnttable presumption. It is no more arduous a task for the
.property appraiser to permit the property owner of platted land to
submit evidence of continued agricultural use than it is to receive,
as he does, similar evidence from the individual who has purchased
property for more than three times its agriculturally assessed value.
Consequently, Section 193.461(4)(x)4., Florida Statutes (1975), fails
i to satisfy the third prong of the due process test.
Appellants suggest that even if Section 193.461(4)(x)4. renders
present agricultural use immaterial to the classification we moat
sustain the enactment because of our decision in Rainey v. .ielsoa,
supra. we acknowledged in Rainey that the legislature. is eapowered to
classify property as agricultural or nonagricultural according to '
criteria wholly unrelated to its present use and, indeed, that it
may altogether remove the favorable ad valorea tax treatment which
it has chosen to confer upon agricultural property. However, the
legislature may not take such action is a manner which results in a
denial of equal projection of the law. As ws have noted,- the
legislature has generally elected to provide for the grant of as
agricultural classification based upon actual use of the property -
as of the assessment date. Bacanse the legislature has chosen to
utilize this standard, equal protection prohibits it from siaglinq out
a class of property owners and classifying their land according to
a standard different from that applied to other real property owners
unless there exists a valid and substantial reason for this disparate
treatment. See Rollins v. State, 354 So.2d 61 (Pia. 1978); State v.
Blackburn, 104 So.2d 19 (Fla. 1958); Relly v. Blackburn, 95 So.2d 260
(Pia. 1957); and Richey v. Kells, 123 Fla. 284,.166 So. 817 (1936). -
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