HomeMy WebLinkAbout0364 in Vero Beach, where Marlon was hospitalized. It was "deter-
mined" Marlon was anemic from acute loss of blood, the wound
was foun3 to be infcctcd and 3 foreign object wac rpm~ved from
the wound.
On December 19, 1977, appellant instituted a claim
for medical mediation. No answer was filed and in due course a
default was entered. The medical mediation proceeding thus ended
on May 30, 1978, and appellants filed suit in the circuit court
charging appellee with medical malpractice. Appellee pleaded
the two year statute of limitations and moved for final summary
judgment, which was granted. It is that judgment which we are
asked to reverse on this appeal.
Appellant contends: 1) that the question of when ap-
pellant knew or should have known of the alleged malpractice is
a question of fact for-the jury, and 2) that since appellee did
not enter into the medical mediation proceeding and allege the
statute of limitations, it is precluded from doing. so in this
litigation.
This court has previously-decided several cases which
make it clear that appellant's second point is without merit. In
Floyd v. Goss, 352 So.2d 1189 (Fla. 4thDCA 1977), this court held
that a judicial referee has no authority to enter a judgment. on
the pleadings when the statute of limitations is pleaded and not
contravened. Later the same year, in Drs. Howarth & Scott, P.A,
v. Edwards, 353 So.2d 175 (Fla. 4thDCA 1977), we held that a
circuit judge sitting as a judicial referee in a medical media-
tion panel is not authorized to grant a summary judgment. Re-
garding the statute of limitations the court said:
If Petitioners are correct that the Statute
of Limitations ran before the claim was filed
then that is a matter of affirmative defense
for the trial court, not the panel or any mem-
ber tKereof, to decide..
Appellee responds to appellant's contention that the
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