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HomeMy WebLinkAbout0289 "It is not necessary that one spouse be completely unable to pay attorneys' fees in order for the trial court to require the other spouse to pay these fees. Given the complexity of the cause and the time necessary to appropriately resolve the issues, the award of attorneys' fees in this case was proper to avoid an inequitable diminution of the fiscal sums granted the wife in these proceedings." We conclude that there has been no demonstration of reversible i error on the part of the trial court in awarding wife's counsel $5,000 which represented only part of the attorneys' fees charged to wife. There is no attack made on the amount of this fee. The fee does not appear to be punitive but appears to have been asses- sed on the basis of the additional work made necessary by the vexatious, oppressive and wanton conduct of the husband during the divorce proceedings. Our review of the record in this regard 1 demonstrates adequate evidence to support the award based upon additional work made necessary by the husband's conduct during the proceedings and on the theory enunciated in Canakaris that to deny fees would work an inequitable diminution in the sums awarded the wife in the-proceedings. We, therefore, affirm the award of attorneys' fees and costs. AFFIRMED. i SOSG~.8 1990 t~QV -3 PN ~ 23 f1LEC +~nC' % Lt:i : U C rt :e, ~i~s 1rC/.11..~'~ T HERSEY and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur. -4- ~,x342 _ ~ ~ .